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NEW STRATEGIES FOR LATINO VOTER MOBILIZATION: 
THE NEVADA DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS AS A CASE STUDY1 
 
BY TOVA ANDREA WANG 
INTRODUCTION 
The Latino population rate has been growing in the United States at a dramatic pace over the past 
several years, and it is accelerating daily. This population increase, the widening realization of the 
potential for wielding influence within the community, and the activities of voting rights and Latino 
advocacy organizations mean that Latino voters could be a major force in American politics this 
election year and beyond. However, that potential can be realized only if Americans of Latino 
descent participate in numbers commensurate with their presence in the population. Historically, 
that has not been the case. Indeed, Latinos have long had a lower rate of participation than either 
whites or African Americans.  
Latino voters have been getting media attention in this election cycle the likes of which has never 
been seen before. The “frontloading” of the primaries meant that states with substantial Latino 
populations—such as California, Texas, and New Mexico—would hold meaningful nominating 
contests for the first time in history. All of these states became major public tests of the building 
Latino political power, with Latino voters holding the balance of the election in their hands. 
No place was this more true than in Nevada, a state that the Democratic Party specifically chose to 
have a contest very early in the process in 2008 because it had a large Latino population.2 Nevada’s 
caucus was held before the contests of any other states with big Spanish-speaking populations. At 
the same time, the party in Nevada had the cards stacked against it in terms of attracting high voter 
participation. The state had no history of great political involvement; caucuses have proved to be 
much more difficult to attract voters to than primaries, for a number of reasons; and most voters in 
the state, particularly those who were relatively new Americans, had no experience voting in 
nominating contests, let alone taking part in the Byzantine ways of a Saturday caucus. 
Knowing the challenges ahead, the state Democratic Party, led by Latino outreach director Andres 
Ramirez, pursued a number of creative strategies to try to boost the participation of Latino voters 
throughout the state, and particularly in and around Las Vegas, where the vast majority of Latinos 
worked and lived. The party’s efforts seem to have paid off: some 20,000 Latinos participated in the 
caucus, and Latinos comprised a much higher proportion of the electorate than in elections past. As 
a result, the Latino outreach program of the state party may provide some new ideas for innovative 
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2004.  
types of approaches to Latino political outreach that might be more effective than those that have 
been traditionally utilized.  
This brief is not meant to be an academic, quantitative analysis or scientific assessment of the 
strategies employed in Nevada in 2008. Rather, it is meant simply to describe the unique nature of 
the Nevada caucus, what transpired with respect to Latino voters there, and suggest ideas advocates 
and academics might look at going forward to increase the participation of this historically 
marginalized group of voters. 
BACKGROUND ON LATINO VOTERS 
Historically, Latino voter participation rates have been very low. Nationally, less than one-third of 
Latinos have voted in presidential elections, while less than one-fourth participated in congressional 
elections.3 But this has been changing over the past few years.  
As of September 2007, there were 18.2 million Latinos eligible to vote in the United States. This was 
up from 16.1 million in 2004. While this is a large bloc of voters, it is an under-representation of the 
Latino population. Comprising 15.3 percent of the overall U.S. population, Latinos are the largest 
minority group in the country, but due to their disproportionately young ages and lack of citizenship, 
they account for only 8.9 percent of eligible voters—still a sizable constituency.4 In terms of actual 
voting, exit polls report that Latinos made up 8 percent of the electorate in the 2006 elections, up 
from 6 percent in 2004.5 Latino participation grew from 5.9 million voters in 2000 to 7 million in 
2004.6 
A major hindrance to Latino participation has been low rates of registration—20 percent of Latino 
citizens were not registered to vote in 2004.7 However, the number of Latinos registering to vote 
has been increasing steadily. According to an analysis by the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 
the percentage growth of Latinos registered to vote was three times that of whites and four times 
that of African Americans between 2000 and 8
While demographics play a key role, the history of low Latino participation rates can be attributed 
partly to the neglect of the two major parties. Studies consistently show that party and campaign 
outreach efforts have a sizable impact on voter turnout. Because Latinos have had low participation 
rates in the past, they have found themselves in a catch-22: since candidates and parties tend to 
focus most on reliable voters, they have usually paid little attention to potential Latino voters. 
PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO INCREASE LATINO PARTICIPATION 
There have been relatively few up-to-date scholarly works dedicated solely to the subject of 
strategies for turning out Latino voters, though the ones that are available are enlightening. Ricardo 
Ramirez, a professor of political science and the University of Southern California, conducted a 
randomized field experiment of hundreds of thousands of registered Latino voters in an effort to 
measure the effectiveness of the voter mobilization effort undertaken by the National Association of 
Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) in 2002. NALEO’s “Voces del Pueblo” 
campaign conducted Latino voter outreach through direct mail, automated phone calls (“robo-
calls”), and live phone calls from volunteers. Ramirez found that only live phone calls “produced a 
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statistically significant increase in voter turnout.”9 Interestingly, he also found that the live phone 
calls worked substantially better than the automated robo-calls, which, he says “underscores the 
importance of the quality of communication with voters”—a point that, as we will later see, the 
leaders of the Nevada effort intuitively understood. “For every twenty-two contacts made by a live 
caller, one new vote was produced. This [higher] result suggests that an informal conversation with a 
committed NALEO caller can help a low-propensity Latino build a bridge to the electoral 
process.”10 
Melissa R. Michelson from California State University reviewed four field experiments in Latino 
participation conducted in a variety of places during a three-year period. She found that, as is the 
case with other groups, in-person, door-to-door outreach is an effective way to mobilize Latino 
voters. When the person doing the outreach is of the same ethnicity and/or party, Latinos are even 
more receptive. “If the messenger somehow is able to establish a common bond with the voter—
either through shared ethnicity or through shared partisanship—then the voter is more likely to hear 
and be affected by the mobilization effort.”11 Other studies by Michelson confirm this finding.12 
In another major study that is ongoing, Michelson teamed up with Lisa Garcia Bedolla from the 
University of California-Irvine and voter-turnout specialist Donald P. Green from Yale to study the 
outreach approaches of a number of organizations working on turning out the vote in low-income 
and minority communities in California in 2006. Among the organizations examined was the Central 
American Resource Center, which conducted voter education to teach voters about the voting 
process and utilized free media among the Spanish language press. The authors did not find much of 
an impact from this effort.13 They also once again reviewed the work of NALEO. Of particular 
interest, NALEO conducted two sets of targeted phone–banking, with volunteers having live 
conversations—in one, the script was short, simply reminding voters to vote; the second script was 
more “information rich,” in which the volunteers talked to the voters about the candidates and the 
issues. The researchers found the second set of phone calls to be much more effective than the first. 
Robo-calls were again found to be ineffective.14 The group also looked at the activities of the 
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, which also did live phone-banking, with some 
voters being contacted as many as three times in the course of three weeks. Once again, talking on 
the phone with a live person was found effectual.15 Overall, the study concluded that best practices 
include face-to-face canvassing, live phone banks, and having a more “information rich” dialogue on 
the phone.16  
A number of Latino organizations have worked on voter mobilization for years, most notably the 
National Council of La Raza and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed 
Officials, referenced above. NCLR has a program called the Latino Empowerment and Advocacy 
Project (LEAP). According to the LEAP training manual, the effort focuses on unregistered, newly 
registered, and infrequent voters. Two of the aims of the program are to train community-based 
organizations to conduct outreach and education and to devise the most effective strategies for 
improving participation. The main components of the program are direct mail, live volunteer 
phone–banking, and door-to-door canvassing at voters’ homes. The manual says that the phone 
calls should encourage turnout, provide information about the place and hours for voting, identify 
voters who need transportation on election day, and recruit volunteers.17  
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In 2006, NCLR teamed up with NALEO, Mi Familia Vota Education Fund, and the largest 
Spanish-language media companies to create “Ya es Hora, ¡Ve y Vota!” (It’s Time, Go Vote!). While 
in its first phase the organization focused on citizenship drives, it is now moving more toward voter 
mobilization. In 2008, the “campaign seeks to increase Latino voter registration and turnout . . . 
through an unprecedented multi-media campaign that encompasses grassroots, print and broadcast 
outreach. In particular, the campaign will use aggressive non-partisan field efforts to ensure that 
Latinos are an important vote in the new Southwestern battleground states.”18 The effort will 
employ community-based organizations, and includes a bilingual hotline, 1-888-Ve-Y-Vota, in 
coordination with the larger voting rights operation Election Protection. Most interestingly, the 
major Spanish-language media is pitching in to help mobilize the millions of Spanish speaking 
viewers that watch their television shows, read their newspapers, and listen to their radio programs 
daily. Even during the primaries, Univision aired public service announcements reminding viewers 
to vote. Print media such ImpreMedia put voter registration information in their newspapers.19  
BACKGROUND ON THE NEVADA CAUCUS 
Nevada has had caucuses since the 1960s, but they have always been held late in the nomination 
process, and have been low-turnout affairs. Voter turnout in Nevada historically has been very low: 
less than 1 percent of eligible voters participated in the 2004 caucus. Even in the general election in 
2004, Nevada ranked forty-second in voter turnout.  
 After considering the issue for many months, the Democratic National Committee’s Commission 
on Presidential Nomination Timing and Scheduling determined to add ethnic and other types of 
diversity to the early part of the nominating process. After receiving presentations from several 
states, the commission decided to include Nevada and South Carolina during the early period of the 
primaries and caucuses. Nevada was chosen primarily because the Democratic Party decided it was 
time to give Latino voters a stronger voice in the process. The party was also driven by the desire to 
include a state from the West that also had a strong union presence.  
The Nevadans had some compelling arguments for being chosen. The Latino power potential in 
that state is significant. The total population of Nevada is about 2.5 million, of which 610,000 are 
Latino, and out of that, 475,000 are Mexican. Nearly one-quarter of Nevadans —24.4 percent—are 
Latino, compared to 14.8 percent nationally. In Las Vegas itself, 30.6 percent of residents are 
Latino—174,203 out of a population of 569,753, with about 137,000 of those being Mexican.20 At 
the same time, it is important not to overstate the case. Only half of Latino Nevadans may be of 
voting age, and of that 300,000, only half were citizens in 2004. Of those citizens, just 83,000 were 
registered to vote, accounting for only 12 percent of the eligible voters.21  
On the other hand, many in and outside the party were skeptical that Latino voters—or any 
voters—would show up in large numbers. Senator Harry Reid was practically laughed at when he 
stated he thought 100,000 voters would participate. More modestly, the Democratic Party of Nevada 
predicted a turnout four times greater than 2004—36,000 voters.22 
The Nevada Democratic Party modeled its process directly on the Iowa caucus. Participants had to 
show up at one of 520 designated caucus locations at 11:30 A.M. on Saturday, January 19, to 
participate. Under the rules of the voting process, each voter publicly had to stand in groups 
representing each of the candidates in order to voice his or her preference. Any citizen who was not 
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registered to vote was able to register as a Democrat at the caucus. Republicans and Independents 
were able to fill out a registration card, switch parties, and participate.  
CAUCUSES: A FLAWED MODEL 
It is notoriously difficult to get all but the most committed party activists to participate in a caucus. 
While this year has been extraordinary in terms of turnout, it is highly anomalous, especially with 
respect to caucus turnout. For example, the percentage of voters who participated in the 2004 Iowa 
caucus was about 6 percent of eligible voters.23 In 2000, when there were wide-open races in both 
parties, the overall turnout of both parties’ contests was almost no better: 6.8 percent. Moreover, 
Iowa’s participation rate is the high-water mark. Voter turnout rates in other states’ caucuses are far 
worse. Most notably, according to the Las Vegas Sun, in Nevada, “With the exception of 2004, when 
about 9,000 voters participated statewide, turnout has often numbered in the hundreds. In 2000 
fewer than 1,000 participated.”24 
Why is this? Usually when a voter participates in a primary or a general election, he or she goes to 
the polling place and votes within a few minutes. People can vote any time of the day from early 
morning until the evening. In a caucus, participants must be on the registration line or be signed in 
by the appointed hour on the day or night of the caucus. Anyone who is late cannot participate. 
Also, participants must expect to spend two hours at the event, sometimes more. Thus, a voter who 
works or goes to school during the hours of the caucus, has small children that must be cared for, or 
is elderly and finds it difficult to go out cannot take part. Furthermore, the caucus process is difficult 
and confusing. There is a complex procession of speeches, physical groupings of voters by candidate 
preference, realignments of groups and re-votes if one or more of the original candidates falls short 
of the necessary 15 percent threshold of support, various public announcements, and party elections 
outside of the voting for the presidential nomination candidates. Finally, for any voter, the caucus 
system in most states requires a great deal of confidence and a high level of information—not only 
about the issues and the candidates, but also the caucus process itself. Every participant in the 
caucus is expected, if not required, to speak publicly, and is required to cast his or her vote publicly, 
in front of neighbors, friends, and colleagues. He or she must do so in the midst of a process that 
has all sorts of complicated rules and procedures. Not every citizen is going to be willing to undergo 
such an ordeal.  
Some voters are structurally barred from participating in caucuses. This most notably includes 
overseas and military voters, since there is no absentee voting. Voters with disabilities may also 
confront barriers to participating in the caucuses. Finally, and most germane, voters with limited 
English are likely to have a harder time navigating the caucus process. Non-English speaking voters, 
who may also very well be first time voters, must not only learn how the relatively simple, but by no 
means easy process for voting in a polling place in a regular election works—they must now be 
willing to go to and find a place they may not be familiar with; understand that they must be there at 
the appointed hour; spend hours of their time; possibly speak and certainly vote publicly in front of 
people they know, possibly people from their workplaces; and follow complex instructions. This 
might be a daunting prospect for some who are new to this country and/or not comfortable 
expressing themselves in English. 
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THE NEVADA DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S LATINO MOBILIZATION EFFORT 
Taking Voting to the People 
In the months before the Nevada caucus, the staff of the Democratic Party responsible mobilizing 
the Latino vote—which was comprised of just two full-time employees—came up with a unique and 
creative game plan to ensure the large and growing Latino voting population showed up to 
participate. The party made a special effort to reach out to new citizens and to Latinos who were 
voters but were unfamiliar with the caucus process, and to register new Latino voters. The staff was 
able to recruit a core group of ten volunteers to do outreach in the Spanish-speaking communities.  
In a major break from traditional get-out-the-vote strategy, the party did not rely solely on 
contacting voters at home, but took their efforts to the workplaces of Latinos. The party did not 
focus only on door-to-door outreach trying, to make contact at times people might be at home—
instead they went to where they work. They went to Latino businesses, such as construction sites and 
restaurants, and talked to employees and customers. They posted information in the mercados and 
supermercados. They worked with employers to get information to and make contact with the 
employees.  
Staff and volunteers placed 1,657 posters and distributed 8,963 brochures in all types of businesses 
that were Latino-owned or had a large Latino customer or client base, including taco shops, tienditas, 
beauty salons, and swap meets. But they did not just focus their efforts on the obvious and easily 
accessible storefront operations—they also delivered materials to the offices of lawyers, insurance 
agencies, doctors, accountants, and notary publics. They went anywhere they could think of that 
might have a large Spanish-speaking clientele and worked with the heads of such businesses to get 
the information out to the community. They then made an effort to build and then maintain 
relationships with these business owners and employers who might not be the usual political 
partners, but had influence in the community in other ways.  
Moreover, the party even took the voting itself to the worksites of a large number of Latino voters 
by holding at-large caucuses in the hotels where the party knew many Latinos would be working on 
a Saturday morning. This took substantial negotiation with the hotels, and as it turned out, Andres 
Ramirez says hotel management actually responded very positively to these efforts and tried their 
best to be cooperative, even though it was not necessarily good for business. After all, the party was 
counting on many of the hotel and casino workers to depart their work duties in large numbers on a 
Saturday. Nonetheless, the party was able to hold training sessions for management about how the 
caucuses would work, and employers sent memos to all staff about participating. For instance, Nine 
Group, a company that owns many of the properties at the Palms, held a mandatory all-staff 
meeting to learn about the process and to let the employees know that the hotel would stop 
operating, if necessary, for the period of caucusing on caucus day.  
The Latino outreach team also went to work in the places where the Latino community went to 
socialize, and brought voting and politics to those events. These were not places where the most 
politically engaged citizenry might be, but team members knew they had to reach this population to 
achieve the participation rates they were aiming for, and this group of potential voters was not going 
to come to them, or show up at a political event.  
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For example, early on the party established a soccer team, “Los Democratas,” that played games in a 
major Latino league. The name itself was picked to prompt a conversation—players and fans might 
wonder what does “Los Democratas” mean? At games, volunteers wearing team t-shirts engaged in 
voter education about the caucus, registered voters, and handed out citizenship applications. They 
were able to engage the community in a nontraditional, very friendly setting, and have dialogues with 
them that were more in depth than they might have been at some other kind of event, on the street, 
or even going door to door (most of these people would never have attended an event that 
specifically was politically oriented). These encounters were in an environment that was fun, not so 
serious, making discussion of the political process perhaps less daunting. 
All told, the party was able to register between 200 and 300 new voters at the games. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, they used the games to talk to disengaged citizens about why they should 
participate and to build trusting relationships. Moreover, the soccer team and the party’s efforts at 
the games attracted a great deal of valuable free media, both print and broadcast, further spreading 
the word about the need to register and participate to the community.  
Party staff and volunteers also went to picnics, Cinco de Mayo festivals, and other Spanish fiestas. 
They crashed private quinceaneras (a girl’s fifteenth birthday party, similar to a sweet sixteen), went to 
posadas (celebrations during the week before Christmas), and made a major effort on a weekly basis 
at courthouse naturalization ceremonies to encourage new citizens to register and take part in the 
caucuses. Again, when going to the communities where they lived their lives and earned their livings, 
the party staff and volunteers did not just hand out flyers, but also talked to people in a two-way 
dialogue. Frequently, citizens would talk to them about the problems they might be having in 
navigating an unfamiliar government system, such as getting construction permits and the like. This 
gave the staff and volunteers the opportunity not only to build trust but also to show the voters how 
these types of issues of concern to them were connected to their own political participation. 
The party held several mock caucuses all over the state, many of which were held in Spanish to teach 
Latinos about the process and how to participate. In one Spanish mock caucus in a heavily Latino 
neighborhood, girls and boys performed Hispanic folklore dances and the school’s mariachi band 
played. In the mock caucus, participants picked their favorite Latino celebrities.25 At other mock 
caucuses, participants picked their favorite pizza toppings. In other words, they made politics fun. 
The Nevada Democratic Party had a complete Spanish-language Web site up and running for 
months ahead of the caucus, www.nuestrocaucus.com. The Web site, like its English counterpart, 
informed visitors about the caucus process and had continually updated news about the party’s 
progress in putting the caucus together, mock caucuses for voters to learn about the process first 
hand and other events, and appearances in the state by the candidates. It featured a video message 
by popular state legislator Ruben Kihuen. It also had a function that allowed a voter to identify his 
or her caucus location. The Spanish language Web site received 2,000 unique visitors per month, and 
32,162 page views in total. 
The party had a Spanish-language hotline up and running in the weeks before the caucus and on 
voting day. The hotline was contacted by many first-time, Spanish-speaking voters. Many of them 
were calling from places in the state that were not predominantly Latino. The hotline was also used 
to conduct translation for voters during the actual caucus proceedings. There was a combination of 
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622 messages left and outgoing calls on the hotline just in the last two days before the caucus. (It is 
unknown how many incoming answered calls there were.) 
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
Free Media 
The staff of the Latino outreach operation also was able to develop unique relationships with the 
Spanish language print and broadcast media. In brief, the staff was able to make the case successfully 
to media executives that the caucuses were the single most important thing happening in the Latino 
community. The Democratic Party had its first media training with the Spanish-language media, 
explaining how the caucus worked and why it was so newsworthy. They built a relationship with the 
Spanish media that would pay dividends in later coverage. 
For example, the Spanish-language cable news station Univision put the staff of the Latino outreach 
effort on the air at least once a week. Univision reported on the caucus everyday. This prompted 
viewer questions, and Univision had the outreach staff answer those questions on the air. The staff 
was also often on the television station Telemundo. El Tiempo Libre, the largest Spanish newspaper 
in the state, had a column in every edition for months leading up to the caucus talking about it, and 
published a multi-page insert with all the information a voter would need to participate shortly 
before caucus day. 
Broadening and deepening the role of the news media may have had more of an impact on Latino 
participation than the mainstream media would have on the general population. Studies have 
indicated that the Spanish-language press has a somewhat different place in the Spanish-speaking 
community than the English-language press does with its wider audience. According to a study by 
the Pew Hispanic Center, “an overwhelming majority of all Latinos (78%) say the Spanish-language 
media is very important to the economic and political development of the Hispanic population. . . . 
These responses suggest that the Spanish-language media play an esteemed role as spokesmen for 
the Latino population and they have a significant influence in the formation of Hispanic 
identities.”26 The Spanish-language press is particularly important for getting messages to m
recent immigrants,27 who may also be first time voters. In the study, 80 percent of foreign-born 
Latinos who got their news in Spanish or both English and Spanish thought that “the news med
help society to solve its problems.”28 Radio is a particularly popular news resource for Latino
Paid Media 
Many believe the paid media was particularly effective in getting the message out. The party used a 
Hispanic marketing firm, Language Sources, rather than a political consulting firm. The company 
did not specialize in politics, but rather in taking information, translating it, and most important 
making it understandable and accessible to the Spanish-speaking audience. Maria Marinch, the head 
of Language Sources, had a background in translation, marketing, and community outreach, giving 
her a unique perspective and insight into the needs of the Latino community. Andres Ramirez likes 
to refer to the approach they took to the paid media campaign as “culturizing” the message. The 
literature and the print and broadcast ads were not simply translated from the English materials but 
were actually very different pieces, though with the same overall message. (See Appendix for a 
sample brochure.) The Web site, mailers, radio, press releases, and billboards were all created with 
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the Spanish-speaking voter in mind. The firm adapted rather than simply translated materials, for the 
Spanish voters.  
For example, with respect to the Web site, the media team analyzed the original English-language 
Web site to see what features of it would be of the most interest to the Latino community. Through 
this analysis, Marinch determined that the caucus was a new concept for the Latino community and 
that many were unfamiliar with the basics of American democracy. As a result, the team decided to 
change the focus and emphasis of the information for the Spanish version of the Web site so that it 
was more about how the caucus process and the American system of democracy worked.  
 
Whereas the English-language versions of both the Web site and the printed materials had 
information about the delegate selection and allocation process, the Spanish versions only made 
brief mention of this. The firm decided that a long discussion of delegates would make the message 
too complex and be a distraction from the introductory information Latino voters really needed. 
There was, again, more focus on explaining the caucus and the importance of participating. Since a 
large majority of Nevada Latinos are Mexican, some of the material was even designed to appeal to 
Mexicans specifically. Certain terms used widely by Mexicans were utilized in the materials. In the 
radio ads, they used scenarios that would be familiar and resonate with the Mexican population. For 
example, one had a son telling his mother he was going off to play soccer and the mother replying, 
no, they were going to caucus.  
 
In addition, Language Sources, in conjunction with the party, created a glossary of Spanish terms 
regarding the caucus process. This was done primarily for the media so that there would be a 
consistency in the use of language in their reporting so that the Latino audience would not be 
confused. The team conducted trainings for the media in using this particular terminology on a 
consistent basis.  
THE DAY OF THE CAUCUS 
The actual caucus ended up being a mixed bag, especially for Latinos. Just ten days before the 
caucus, the heavily Latino and very powerful Culinary Workers Union endorsed Senator Obama. It 
was widely believed that this endorsement would swing a substantial number of Latinos to Obama, 
which led to charges from the Clinton campaign of strong-arm tactics by the union and even a 
lawsuit by another union (supporting Clinton) challenging the way in which delegates were 
apportioned throughout the state. In particular, the lawsuit alleged that voters in the hotel 
caucuses—where most of the Culinary Union’s employees worked—were given a disproportionate 
number of delegates. The judge in the case swiftly dismissed the claim. Both campaigns courted the 
Latino vote heavily, campaigning in Latino neighborhoods, using Latino surrogates, and putting up 
paid advertisements in Spanish. 
Many potential participants, including Latinos, continued to be confused and put off by the process 
right up until the end. Where I observed the caucus, at the Luxor Hotel and Casino, and at other 
hotels, many employees did not know about the caucus, did not think they could participate, or were 
confused about the process. Many did not understand that they had the right to take the time to go, 
that their bosses had agreed to this, and they could not be denied the opportunity to participate. 
Others workers, such as the dealers and the waitresses, did not want to go because so much of their 
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income depended on tips. While they might not lose out on salary by taking a few hours off, they 
could not afford to lose the tips on a major weekend day.  
There were also reports that many members of the predominantly Latino Culinary Workers Union 
were afraid to vote publicly in front of union leaders, especially those workers who wanted to vote 
for Hillary Clinton instead. 
On caucus day itself, some caucuses went smoothly, while others definitely did not. There was a lot 
of chaos in a number of caucus sites. As one newspaper put it, “Counts were inaccurate. Rules were 
interpreted inconsistently. Doors were shut early in some places. Some precincts lacked a 
chairperson to run the meeting.”30 Another said “There were frequent complaints of overcrowded 
polls, long lines, inability to hear instructions and a process that was far too time consuming.”31 This 
confusion likely depressed the final turnout numbers, including in the Latino community. For 
example, at Rancho High School, located in a heavily Latino area, about one-third of the voters left 
before the final vote count because it was so disorganized. 
Even though there were problems, the results were nonetheless impressive. Overall, Democratic 
turnout was 117,599, which amounts to about 30 percent of all registered Democrats in Nevada—
compared to a turnout of 9,000 four years ago.32 About 30,000 people registered to vote at the 
caucuses.33 Much was made of the fact that Clinton won the Latino vote by a two-to-one margin, 
and won most of the caucuses held in the hotels, where the Culinary Workers Union’s endorsement 
of Obama had been expected to be a major influence.  
LATINO REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT FOR THE CAUCUS 
About 18,000 to 20,000 Latino voters participated in the caucus statewide, and comprised 
approximately 15 percent of the Democratic electorate. In the 2004 general election, Latinos 
comprised only 10 percent of the Nevada electorate, and 60 percent of those voters chose John 
Kerry. In other words, the proportion of Latino voters that voted for the Democratic candidate in 
the general election was only 6 percent.34 Therefore it seems clear the Latino vote did go up. The 
party also registered about 3,000 Latinos in the months leading up to the caucus. Of the 30,000 who 
registered at the caucuses, 1,519 of them were Latino. 
Less encouraging was that only 2,600 Latinos participated in the at-large caucuses, less than 
expected. It is unclear why this was so. It may have been because some hotel workers participated in 
their home precincts, especially given the speculation that hotel employees were nervous about 
voting publicly in front of Culinary Workers Union leaders. Even given the disappointing showing, 
there is a strong chance that many of the voters would have been simply unable to participate if the 
workplace voting option had not been available.  
The overall increase in Latino participation is not in doubt. What is less obvious is how to parse out 
all the reasons that might have taken place—whether it was the efforts of the Nevada Democratic 
Party, or the mobilization conducted by the highly influential unions (especially the Culinary 
Workers Union), the excitement around the candidates, the centrality of the immigration issue in the 
national debate, or some other reason. This is especially true given that Latino turnout was up in 
primaries throughout the country, most notably in California. Moreover, if the rise in participation 
was somewhat attributable to the efforts of the party’s Latino outreach effort, what aspects of that 
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effort were most effective, and which were not worth the time and resources? That is beyond the 
ability of this brief to discern. Nonetheless, the activities of the Nevada Democratic Party do suggest 
some new ways of thinking about how to increase the historically low Latino participation rate, and 
the turnout level for other groups, for both parties and nonpartisan organizations. 
POTENTIAL NEW LATINO OUTREACH MODELS 
The most unique new strategy for increasing voter turnout used in Nevada was that of using the 
voter’s workplace as a base for mobilization activities, and even for voting itself. Of course, in many 
settings this will be impossible. Many companies and institutions, appropriately, will not allow any 
political activity to occur at the workplace on a number of legitimate grounds. On the other hand, it 
seems that many business and employers were much more receptive to this kind of activity than one 
might first think.  
The Las Vegas casinos and hotels are an interesting example. To be sure, there certainly were reports 
of some managers not being supportive of employees leaving to caucus, but at the senior level, 
support seemed genuine. It is hard to imagine that  having the caucus in the hotel was directly 
beneficial to its bottom line. Whatever tangential public relations or employee goodwill bonus points 
there were to be gained—and there were some—the fact was that owners risked large numbers of 
employees simply walking off the job for two to three hours in the middle of a Saturday on a major 
football weekend. Yet hotel and casino management turned out to be mostly helpful partners. 
One vivid of example of this partnership was on display at the Luxor. There was a huge banner 
behind the podium that said “MGM Mirage Supports 2008 Caucus,” and another that said, “Rev Up 
2008—MGM Mirage—Register Educate Vote.” When the caucus process continued well after the 
time it was supposed to end, a number of the participants became visibly nervous about needing to 
get back to their posts. The caucus manager tried to reassure them that under the agreement the 
party had with the hotel it was fine if they were a few minutes late. A few moments later, however, 
the manager announced that Felix Rappaport, the COO of the Luxor, wanted to address the group. 
Mr. Rappaport got on the microphone and told the audience that what they were doing at the 
caucus was more important than their day-to-day jobs. He said they were participating in the 
American political process, engaging in what makes America great. So, he said, “don’t worry about 
being late. Don’t worry about anything.” The crowd roared.  
In addition to the hotels and casinos, there were all the store fronts and professional offices and the 
construction sites where the staff was able to engage in voter outreach. The receptivity of the 
business community was impressive. 
It may be that there is something in the lifestyles of members of the Latino community that makes 
trying to contact them through their workplaces more effective than trying to get them at home. 
Census data shows that Latinos move more often than other groups. Generally, voters who move 
more often have lower participation rates than voters with greater residential stability. The 
complexities of voter registration explain a good deal of this as well as other socio-economic factors, 
but another reason is that more mobile voters are contacted less frequently by mobilization 
campaigns. This in part is because they are perceived as less invested in the community, but it is 
surely also the case that they are harder to pin down for outreach. That there is less campaign 
outreach to mobile voters has been found to be especially true for the Latino community.35  
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Trying to contact Latinos somewhere other than the home makes sense. In general, the idea of 
phone and door-to-door canvassing at people’s homes has always seemed limited. It is always hit or 
miss whether the voter will be home and many people become turned off by being bothered in the 
privacy of their homes. By investing in building relationships with the business community that 
caters to a largely Latino audience, there may be opportunities in some unexpected places for Latino 
voter mobilization activists.  
Bringing the voting process closer to the workplace has been discussed in other contexts, and the 
caucuses demonstrated its utility. Although turnout was not as high as hoped for at the hotel voting 
sites, those were still potentially hundreds or thousands of participants who might have been barred 
from the process had the option not been made available. Academic studies have found that the 
commute to the polling site can be a deterrent to participation, especially during a work day.36 
Researchers further have found that putting voting sites in “nontraditional locations” such as 
supermarkets, convenience stores, and shopping malls may increase voter turnout.37 There are 
practical obstacles to such an approach, not the least of which is finding an appropriate space. 
Another obstacle that might be noted is the problem of reconciling voting away from home with 
our current system of determining voting location by the precinct in which the voter lives. But as the 
movement toward “vote centers”—centrally located polling centers where anyone who lives within 
the county can vote at regardless of precinct—demonstrates, we are already moving away from a 
precinct based system of voting. In short, these may be obstacles that can be overcome. 
Another strategy to consider expanding is that of conducting outreach in nonpolitical environments, 
as the Nevadans did with the soccer team and by going to a wide range of Latino-oriented 
community events. Get-out-the-vote workers have long gone to local fairs and parades, stood on 
street corners, and conducted voter registration at supermarkets. But the Nevada effort was more 
specifically targeted and was taken to places where the staff and volunteers interacted with people in 
a setting in which they were enjoying themselves. It was not a passive effort of standing at a booth. 
It was an act of engagement.  
Moreover, by choosing the sites they did, and in particular by setting up the soccer team and having 
the games, they achieved the perhaps unlikely merger of politics and fun. There is a body of 
emerging experimental research showing that holding a community festival outside voting sites can 
lead to increased participation. As the authors of one such study say, “A century and a half ago, 
casting a vote was a celebratory experience, as voters at the polls engaged their friends, imbibed free 
booze, listened to lively entertainment, and generally had a good time. Americans have lost touch 
with the raucous and engaging elections of the past. . . .  Our polling places have been drained of 
their celebratory elements, and the 90%-plus rates of voter turnout that accompanied them have 
disappeared from our collective consciousness.”38 
Another interesting aspect of the Nevada experience was the use of a Hispanic marketing firm 
rather than a political consulting firm to create original materials uniquely targeted at the Spanish 
language audience. While it is not unprecedented to use a marketing firm rather than a political 
consultant to do Latino outreach,39 it does not seem to be standard procedure. If Latino voters are 
going to be a priority, it makes sense to utilize tools that will be most effective in reaching that 
audience, rather than just parroting in Spanish what English-speaking voters are receiving. This goes 
again to the issue raised by the academic literature in their discussion of the “quality of 
communication.” It is not enough to say we have reached out to the Latino community; it seems to 
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be potentially more effective if the communication is culturally adapted in a way that will resonate 
with Spanish speakers. 
Finally, there is also the concept of the mock caucuses to build on. For many, especially voters not 
born in this country, the voting process is unfamiliar, and this can act as a deterrent to participation. 
Much political science research has found that increases in information lead to higher levels of 
engagement. Regardless of whether the process is a caucus or a polling place vote, it might be 
advantageous to expand upon this idea of going out into neighborhoods and in friendly group 
settings going through a dress rehearsal, in Spanish, of what the voting day experience will be like. 
This would not only help voters become more comfortable with the process, but could also serve as 
a new point of contact for the organizations putting together such exercises and interested members 
of the community. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As it is unclear what specific degree of impact the Nevada Democratic Party’s strategies produced, 
this analysis presents several recommendations for further research, by Latino advocacy 
organizations and academics. Field experiments looking at differences when voter mobilization is 
conducted where people work versus where people live is one area ready made for academic inquiry. 
Similar experiments could be tried to see whether engaging in mobilization activities through 
otherwise purely entertainment venues, such as the soccer team, could be undertaken. Could this be 
expanded upon to greater effect, for example by having Latino oriented turnout festivals close to 
Election Day?40 Given the growing prevalence of “vote centers,” testing whether having a poll 
location near to somewhere a voter works rather than lives could also easily be explored further by 
the academic community. 
There is also this issue of the relationship between the “quality of communication” and how 
“information-rich” communications are and voter participation. Academic studies referred to earlier 
are the first steps in looking at whether voter contact that entails more interactive, in-depth dialogue 
is more effective than more direct, one-way messaging. Researchers need to explore this further, 
including whether, given how relatively labor intensive such efforts are, it is cost effective. It 
certainly seemed to make a difference with Nevada Latinos, and it is an effort that may continue to 
pay dividends in terms of community engagement well into the future.  
More research also needs to be conducted on the role of the Spanish-language media in engaging the 
Spanish-speaking citizenry. The Pew study cited suggests that Spanish-language media may play a 
different role in the Latino community than the English-language press does in the population at 
large. Perhaps it is seen by Latino Americans as more of a community resource, a place that brings 
the culture together, in a way that is not the case for Anglos and other groups. If so, that might 
suggest ways in which advocacy organizations and the parties could deepen ties with local media, 
especially Latino media, to boost political engagement. 
Finally, this matter of not translating campaign and advocacy materials, but, as Andres Ramirez puts 
it, “culturizing” the material, needs to be examined further. Is there a quantifiable difference 
between materials simply translated into Spanish from the English versus materials that have been 
created uniquely for the Latino voter that utilize messages, language, and images that will resonate 
more with this community?  
CONCLUSION 
Every election season in recent years has seen some pundits declare that it is the year the Latino vote 
will finally have its voice heard, and every time that optimistic prediction has failed to be borne out. 
So far, 2008, with increased turnout by the Latino community in the primaries throughout the 
country, there is more hope that reality will match the optimism this year. Yet there is still much 
work to be done to ensure that this population achieves its political potential. The Nevada 
Democratic Party’s work was encouraging and should serve as a model for other groups and 
candidates seeking to reach the Latino voter—if for no other reason than it was uniquely focused on 
the Spanish-speaking voter and the party’s staff used an unusual degree of creativity in their 
methods. More research is needed to see if the particular strategies utilized by Andres Ramirez and 
his team can or should be replicated. As the Latino voting bloc continues to increase, such analysis 
will be of enormous value to all key players in the political process.  
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